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evidence. As has been stated before, the trend seems to be towards allow-
ing such evidence, and it would seem that eventually the remaining
courts which have not as yet ruled on this question should have no
trouble when such a question arises, as the rule herein advocated seems
clearly to be the more rational view.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-IMMUNITY
FROM TORT LIABILITY
American courts seem to be drawing further and further away from
the idea that charitable institutions should not be held liable in tort actions.
Ever since 1871, when the idea that a charitable institution might be
immune from liability for its torts was first introduced into our system of
laws, this concept has created such a divergence of legal opinion that it
would seem to be almost irreconcilable as a basic legal concept.
The theory is simply that these institutions, such as hospitals, churches,
YMCA's, universities and the like, because they exist mainly on donated
trust funds and supposedly are not interested in making a profit, should
be exempt from the application of general tort rules which otherwise
would be applied.
HISTORICAL FALLACY
A brief glance at the history of the immunity doctrine will show that
possibly with a little more research on the part of our early American
jurists, the doctrine might never have appeared at all in the United States.
The doctrine declaring charitable institutions' immune from tort liabil-
ity was first declared in this country in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen-
eral Hospital,2 where in sole reliance upon the English case of Holliday
v. St. Leonard3 the court held that the funds of a charitable hospital could
not be diminished by a charity patient's claim for damage resulting in
unskilled treatment by the house surgeon, if due care had been exercised
in selecting the surgeon. Nine years later, in 1885, in Perry v. House of
Refuge,4 again solely on the strength of a second early English case5 the
1 The majority of the cases herein discussed involve the tort liability of charitable
or non-governmental corporations as distinguished from governmental charities. Cases
involving the tort liability of the trustee of an unincorporated charitable trust have
been included in so far as they present questions peculiar to the liability of the trust
as distinguished from the liability of the trustee as an individual.
2 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
a 11 C.B. N.S. 192, 123 E.R. 169 (1861). This case involved an action against the
vestry of a parish. The court said this was a public body, clothed with a public trust,
and refused to sustain an action for injury caused by a defect in a highway under
its control.
463 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885).
5 The decision was based on the case of Heriots Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F.
507, 8 E.R. 1508 (1846), involving an action for wrongful exclusion from the bene-
fits of the defendant charity, and not for personal injury inflicted in its operation.
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Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the funds of the defendant institu-
tion could not be used to compensate an inmate for an assault committed
upon him by one of its officers in the infliction of punishment. These
were the first two American decisions on the immunity doctrine.
It is interesting to note that both of the English cases relied upon by
our courts were based upon the case of Duncan v. Findlater6 which was
subsequently overruled by Mersey Docks v. Gibbs7 in 1866, before the
immunity doctrine was incorporated into United States law. Again in
1871, in Foreman v. Canterbury Corp.,8 the English court stated that the
Holliday case was in effect, though not by name, overruled by the House
of Lords in the Mersey Docks case. Both American courts were apparent-
ly unaware of the fact that the sole authorities cited by them had been
repudiated some ten years previous.
Today the rule in England, insofar as hospitals are not liable for an
employee's negligence if the employee was selected with due care, is based
upon the ground that professional workers are not servants of the hospital
but independent experts performing service for the patient,9 or that the
hospital has undertaken only to supply competent personnel but has not
undertaken to guarantee the proper performance by such personnel of its
duties.10 The law of Canada also turns upon similar considerations" and
the immunity doctrine has been expressly rejected there.12
THE DOCTRINE-ITS THEORIES AND OBJECTIONS TO THEM
The law of immunity from tort liability of non-governmental charities
is today recognized by our American courts as being in a great state of
confusion both as to reasoning and to results. 13
If an injured party was to bring an action in one of our state courts
seeking recovery for tort liability against a non-governmental charitable
corporation, any one of four decisions might be handed down, depending
on the policy of the jurisdiction. For instance, if the suit were brought in
66 Clark & F. 894, 7 E.R. 934 (1839).
7 11 H. L. Cas. 686, 11 E. R. 1500 (1866).
8 [1871] 6 Q.B. 214.
9 Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820, 9 B. R. C. 1 (C.A.). Also
see Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council [1947] K.B. 598, 1 All E.R. 633.
10 Hall v. Lees [1904] 2 K.B. 602 (CA.).
11 Myberg v. Provost Municipal Hospital Board [1927] Can. S. C. 226, 1 D. L. R.
969; Sisters of St. Joseph v. Fleming [1938] Can. S. C. 172, 2 D. L. R. 417. See also 14
Canadian Bar. Rev. 699 (1936).
12 Donaldson v. St. John's General Public Hospital, 30 New Br. 279 (1890); La-
verne v. Smith's Falls Public Hospital, 35 Ont. L. 98, 26 D. L. R. 346 (1915).
13 See the following cases: Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220
(1951); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940);
Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950).
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Arizona, plaintiff would be allowed to maintain the action because here
charities are liable in tort to the same extent as individuals or private
corporations,14 but if the action were brought in Arkansas, it would be
dismissed, since here such a charity enjoys complete immunity 15 from
tort liability.' On the other hand, if the action should be brought in
Illinois, plaintiff would be allowed to maintain the action and recover a
judgment, and the immunity of the defendant would extend only to pro-
tecting its trust property from being taken on execution of this judg-
ment,' 7 or if the same action were brought in West Virginia, plaintiff
would find that such a charity enjoys a "partial immunity" dependent
upon plaintiff's status as a servant of the charity, as a stranger, or as a
beneficiary of the charity's bounty, and also dependent upon the nature
of the negligence involved.' 8
There seem to be five prevailing theories upon which decisions are
based wherein immunity is granted.
The trust fund theory.-Since the funds of a charity are held in trust
for some beneficial purpose, the courts will not permit these funds to be
attacked and depleted in a tort action. This, it is felt, would thwart the
donor's intent and impair the usefulness of charitable institutions.19 It is
also argued that donors would not contribute to such a trust if the funds
could be depleted by tort liability.
But it has been said that the donor has neither the power under the
law 20 nor any intention in fact 21 to exempt charities from the operation
of the general laws of the land. Judge Hays, in Haynes v. Presbyterian
Hospital Association,2 2 speaking of the trust fund theory said:
14 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); overruling
Southern Methodist Hospital & Sanitarium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. 2d 118
(1935).
15
.The term complete immunity in referring to tort liability is not precisely accu-
rate since it has been held that although the charity enjoys a complete immunity it
will still be liable for damage resulting from the maintenance and operation of a
nuisance. See Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W. 2d 896
(1953); but see Fields v. Mountainside Hospital, 22 N.J. Misc. 72, 35 A. 2d 701 (C.C.
1944).
16 Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (D.C. Ark., 1950);
Arkansas Valley Co-op Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W. 2d 538
(1940).
17 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950). Slenker v. Gordon, 344 Ill.
App. 1, 100 N.E. 2d 354 (1951), recognizing rule.
18 Meade v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, 74 S.E. 2d 405 (W.Va., 1953).
19 Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S. W. 2d 749 (1943);
Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921).
20 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931).
21 President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, (App.
D.C., 1942).
22 241 Iowa 1269, 1273, 45 N.W. 2d 151, 154 (1950).
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No doubt at the outset of the theory the need for charity ... was urgent and
the general good of society demanded encouragment thereof. At that time,
hospitals, being the particular so called charity which we have before us, were
relatively few in number, and were created and conducted solely by funds
donated by public spirited people.... The granting of immunity from liability
for the negligence of their employees may have been proper as a basis for en-
couraging such charity. Today the situation is vastly different. The hospital
of today has grown into an enormous business. They own and hold large assets,
much of it tax free by statute, and they employ many persons.,... Thus it is
evident that times have changed, and are now changing, in the business, social,
economic, and legal worlds. The basis for, and the need of such encourage-
ment is no longer existent.
Theory holding doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable.-The
doctrine of "respondeat superior" in its simplest form merely says that a
master will be liable for the torts of his servant if done within the scope
of the servant's employment. Some cases have held that merely because of
the charitable nature of the defendant, the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply since the charity receives no profits from the acts of its
employees. 23 This has been rejected in some courts by a ruling that the
master's liability is predicated not on whether he receives a profit from his
servant's work,2 4 but on the authority and control which he exercises over
them.25
Governmental immunity theory.-Some courts have rested immunity on
the ground that charitable institutions because of their intimate association
with the state are entitled to the immunity of the state and its agencies. 26
But this theory has been vastly repudiated, 2 even where the charity was
exempt from state taxation, and received state appropriations for its sup-
port.28
Implied waiver or assumption of risk theory.-Some courts have
reasoned that by accepting the benefits of a charity the beneficiary waives
23 Bachman v. YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922); Morrison v. Henke,
165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917).
24 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Gable v.
Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940).
25 Lichty v. Carbon County Agricultural Ass'n, 31 F. Supp. 809 (D.C. Pa., 1940).
26 University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907), stating
that charitable institutions are exempt from liability for negligent injury to patients
on the ground that they are mere instrumentalities brought into being to aid in the
performance of governmental or public duty; Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935).
2 7 Lichty v. Carbon County Agricultural Ass'n, 31 F. Supp. 809 (D.C. Pa., 1940);
Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College and Flower Hospital, 228 N.Y.
183, 126 N.E. 722 (1920); Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244
(1940); Old Folks' & Orphans Children's Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind. App. 533, 171
N. E. 10 (1930).
28 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Ad. 435 (1931).
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liability, or assumes the risk of negligence.2 9 This argument is logically
weak and based upon a fiction,30 since it is impossible to say in fact that
the recipient of benefits, say a hospital patient, has knowingly agreed to
relinquish any claims for negligence. This is borne out especially when
we deal with desperately ill or unconscious patients when admitted to the
hospital or with infants or insane persons who have no legal capacity to
so give away their rights.3 1
The public 'policy theory.-The fifth theory allowing immunity is pub-
lic policy, which is not really a theory at all, but rather a frank statement
of the reason for immunity without resort to theoretical justifications
which are themselves statements of policy in theoretical form.32 All of
these theories propounded may be said to rest finally upon public opinion.
But it is startling to find that within the United States, public policy
justifies such inconsistent rules as the one denying any immunity and the
rule granting complete immunity.33 A prime example of the misuse of
public policy is an existing situation in South Carolina where a charity
has been held to be immune for tort liability resulting in injury or death
to an individual, but has been liable in tort for the existence of a nuisance.' 4
These decisions are based on the public policy of the state.
Thus it is seen that each of the theories upon which immunity is
granted have been greatly criticized and their weak points exposed by
the courts that have rejected them.
Aside from decisions granting complete immunity and those holding
charities liable as individuals are a small number of states which allow a
suit to be brought and a judgment obtained, but limit recovery on the
29Averback v. YMCA, 250 Ky. 34, 61 S.W. 2d 1066 (1933); Winslow v. Veterans
of Foreign Wars Nat. Home, 328 Mich. 488, 44 N.W. 2d 19 (1950); Sisters of Charity
v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
30 President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, (App.
D.C., 1942); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940);
Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950); Wendt v.
Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947).
31 Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 11l. App. 618, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947). To the same
effect are: President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810
(App. D.C., 1942); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 212 Miss. 564, 55 So. 2d
142 (1951), sugg. of error overr., 213 Miss. 244, 56 So. 2d 709 (1952); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950); Vanderbilt U. v. Hender-
son, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938).
32 See note in 25 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 612, 613 (1950).
33 See Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Tucson v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P.
2d 455 (1952); Mulloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951); Wilson v. Lee
Memorial Hospital, 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla., 1953); Granting immunity see Bond v. Pitts-
burgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328 (1951); Baldwin v. St. Peters Congregation, 264 Wis.
626, 60 N.W. 2d 349 (1953).
84Peden v. Furman U., 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930), showing liability for main-
taining a nuisance; Vermillion v. Woman's College, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916),
showing no liability for injuries because of public policy.
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judgment to the amount of the non-trust funds held by the charity.35
This immunity then merely protects the trust funds of the charity.
And there is a fourth group of courts that tend to grant a limited im-
munity dependent on a number of factors which again vary with the juris-
diction. In many cases the immunity of a charity depends upon the status
of the victim and will rise or fall on whether or not the injured party
was a servant of the charity,30 a stranger,3 7 a beneficiary, or a paying
patient.38 Also cases have hinged upon the question of negligence by the
charity; was it corporate or administrative negligence; or was the charity
negligent in selecting its employees or in supplying instrumentalities?
These are generally the important issues where partial immunity is the
rule. In some of the cases a charity has been held not to be immune for
negligence chargeable to the charity itself, as distinguished from negli-
gence committed by subordinate employees. 3 9 In others, the charity has
been granted immunity, even though the negligence is chargeable, not
only to subordinate employees, but directly to the charity itself.40 The
soundness of this distinction between corporate and other negligence has
been questioned in cases which deny immunity entirely. In Ray v. Tuc-
soil 4 1 the court stated:
There can be no sound reason given for such distinction upon either of the
theories assigned for the rule.... A corporation can only act through its em-
ployees and the fact that the inquiry is due to the negligence of one who is
charged with the management of the institution does not change the fact that
he too is an employee. The distinction is based solely upon a legal fiction ...
If the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to charitable institutions,
that ends it.
Because of these differences in our courts' decisions, many questions
have arisen to confront modern jurists. "There are two sides to every
story" would seem to be the governing maxim in attempting to correlate
the court's answers to these problems. For instance, in a situation where
35 Colorado, Illinois, Tennessee.
36 Denying immunity-Kress v. Newark, 8 N.J. 562, 86 A. 2d 185 (1952). Sustain-
ing immunity-Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557 (1933).
37 Denying immunity-Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P. 2d
729 (1946). Sustaining immunity-Southern Methodist v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176
S.W. 2d 749 (1943); Felan v. Lucey, 259 S.W. 2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App., 1953).
38 Denying immunity-Ray V. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220
(1951). Sustaining immunity-Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J.
533, 82 A. 2d 187 (1951); Williams v. Randolph Hospital Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.
2d 303 (1953); Rafferzeder v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital, 30
N.J. Super. 82, 103 A. 2d 383 (1954).
39 White v. Providence Hosp., 80 F. Supp. 76 (D.C. Dist. Col. 1943); Haliburton v.
General Hospital Soc., 133 Conn. 61, 48 A. 2d 261 (1946).
40Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 82 A. 2d 187 (1951);
Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E. 2d 662 (1951).
41 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951).
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a charity, though immune from liability, may be liable for breach of con-
tract upon allegation of facts which may also give rise to a cause of action
in tort, the courts are divided as to whether the charity may be held
liable for the breach of contract. The majority of the courts that have
ruled on the question have held that the charity cannot be held liable by
changing the action from tort to one of contract,42 but some courts have
refuted immunity on this point. 43
The question arises as to whether a charity may claim payment for its
services after it has committed a tort, if the charity cannot be sued by the
injured party. In Beverly Hospital v. Early4 4 the court held that the hos-
pital's suit was in effect, on the "common counts," and that it was not
necessary to consider whether the hospital's immunity would protect it
from claims set up in recoupment, but was merely contesting the issue
raised by the hospital as to the value of its services.
Concerning joint tortfeasors the rule seems to be that the immunity of
a charity from tort liability defeats a claim of a joint tortfeasor for con-
tribution or indemnity. 45
In addition to the grounds relied upon in rejecting the specific theories
in support of immunity, the courts advocating abandonment of the im-
munity rule have pointed out that the rule found its way into the law
through misconceptions or misapplication of previously established prin-
ciples, 46 that it is doubtful whether the administration of justice has ever
been well served by the rule, 47 that in any event the rule has become out-
moded48 and is an anachronism, 49 that it is a principle of law as well as of
morals that men must be just before they are generous;50 that a charity
42 See Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 83 A. 2d 753 (Del., 1951); Forrest v. Red
Cross Hospital Inc., 265 S.W. 2d 80 (Ky., 1954); Lovich v. Salvation Army, 81 Ohio
App. 317, 75 N.E. 2d 459 (1947); Field v. Mountainside Hospital, 22 N.J. Misc. 72,
35 A. 2d 701 (C.C., 1944).
43 Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So. 2d 632 (La. App., 1943).
44 292 Mass. 201, 197 N.E. 641 (1935). As to the right of a paying patient to recover
his payments, see Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 111. App. 81 (1912).
4 5 Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328 (1951).
46 For cases recognizing the proposition stated above, see the following: President
& Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (App. D.C., 1942);
Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 212 Miss. 564, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950).
47 Stearns v. Schenectady Day Nursery, 262 App. Div. 638, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 277 (1941),
aff'd without opp. 288 N.Y. 574,42 N.E. 2d 24 (1942).
48 Dissenting opinion in Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328 (1951).
49 Robinson, J., concurring in Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. 2d 204, 105
P. 2d 32 (1940).
50Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939); Nicholson v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Forest v. Red Cross Hos-
pital, Inc., 265 S.W. 2d 80 (Ky., 1954); Turnage v. New Bern Consistory, 215 N.C.
798, 3 S.E. 2d 8 (1939).
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should not be permitted to inflict injury upon some without the right of
redress, in order to bestow charity upon others,51 because the result would
be to compel the victim to contribute to the charity against his will; 52
that the law's emphasis generally is on liability rather than on immunity
for wrongdoing, 5 and that in particular the modern tendency of the law
is to shift the burden from the innocent victim to the community at
large, 54 and to distribute losses incurred by individuals through the opera-
tion of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than to leave them
wholly to be borne by those who sustained them;5 5 and that immunity
tends to foster neglect, while liability tends to induce care and caution; 56
and that all persons, organizations, and corporations stand on an equality
before the law and all should be bound alike or excused alike; 57 that the
charitable nature of a tortfeasor cannot place it above the law set up for
all;58 and that protection of life and limb by organized society is of
greater importance to mankind than any species of charity, and is superior
to property rights.59 Judge Wertz of the Supreme Court of Kansas speak-
ing of the immunity doctrine recently said:
It gives to certain favored ones, selected arbitrarily, immunity from that
equal liability for civil wrongs which is a sign of equality between citizens.
... It takes from individuals the right to assert in the courts claims against all
51 President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (App.
D.C., 1942); Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 At. 435 (1931);
Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950).
52Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); Mississippi
Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 212 Miss. 564, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950).
53Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950).
54President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (App.
D.C., 1942); Forest v. Red Cross Hospital, Inc., 265 S.W. 2d 80 (Ky., 1954).
55 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); Mississippi
Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 212 Miss. 564, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
56 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 212 Miss. 564, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951);
Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939); Sheehan v.
North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. 2d 28 (1937); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Church, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950). Also see dissenting
opinion of Doefler, J., in Bachman v. YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
In De Fraites v. YMCA, 49 Pa. D. & C. 652, 655 (1943), the court quoted from
31 Harv. L. Rev. 482, as follows: "A negligently administered charity may aim at in-
ducing us all into the Kingdom of Heaven, but it is socially essential to make it
adequately careful of the methods employed."
57 Dissenting opinion in Webb v. Vought, 127 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170 (1929). The
principal case was recently overruled by Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan.
751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).
58 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 At. 435 (1931); Forest v.
Red Cross Hospital, Inc., 265 S.W. 2d 80 (Ky., 1954); see also Bruce v. Central
Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
59 Doefler, J., dissenting in Bachman v. YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
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who tortiously assail their person and property and to recover judgment for
the injuries done .... In short it destroys equality and creates special privilege. 60
LIABILITY INSURANCE
A new development arose in the history of the immunity doctrine
when charitable institutions began to take out liability insurance. Charities
in an immunity jurisdiction desire a policy of this type because by the
agreement the insurance company usually agrees to defend all such tort
actions, valid or otherwise, and to pay for the expense of the trial. Such
policies also guarantee to pay the full amount of any judgment ren-
dered against the charity in such an action. In the states that do not grant
any immunity such a policy is a sound business investment and a neces-
sary expenditure. But in the states granting a full or partial immunity it
would seem that the courts should reconsider where a liability policy is
involved. For instance, in a jurisdiction allowing immunity on the trust
fund theory, the logic behind the theory falls when it is seen that the
money to pay the judgment would come from the insurance and thus
would not dissipate the trust fund. However, the fact that a charity has
liability insurance has been reconciled by the courts granting immunity,
even where the basic reason is the trust fund theory."'
The court in Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospita6 2 felt that if the
existence of liability insurance would alter the liability of the charity this
might eventually dissipate the trust funds to some extent, in that the
amount of premiums charged in this type of policy is calculated to some
extent upon the amount of risk involved, that the charity might be com-
pelled under such a rule to pay higher premiums, and also, to the extent of
the excess of the premiums paid, the funds of the institution would be
dissipated.
But this line of reasoning has been criticized on the ground that it pro-
ceeds on the illogical theory that an injured party cannot recover from a
charity because this would dissipate the trust funds, but that whether
there be a diversion of the trust or not, there can be no recovery for the
same reason.
63
Liability insurance does make a difference in those states that adhere
G0 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934, 943 (1954). The Su-
preme Court of Kansas herein overruled their previous policy granting immunity,
and held that charitable institutions are liable for the torts of their servants from which
injury proximately results to a third person, whether stranger or patient and whether
the patient is a paying or a non-paying patient.
01 McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op Industries & Stores, 272 Mass. 121, 172 N.E.
68 (1930); Enman v. Trustees of Boston U., 270 Mass. 299, 170 N.E. 43 (1930);
Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital, 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S.W. 2d 469 (1945).
62 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S.W. 2d 469 (1945).
63 Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 (La. App., 1934).
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to the rule exempting trust property from execution. Here such policies
are not considered as part of the trust fund and therefore may be intro-
duced into evidence to show that the charity has non-trust assets which
are subject to execution of a judgment rendered against it.64
The general rule which seems to have evolved from all this is that the
immunity of a charity from tort liability, as distinguished from exemption
of its trust property from execution, is not lost, or otherwise affected, by
the fact that the charity carries liability insurance.65
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
At the present time there are ten states which grant a complete im-
munity to charitable institutions.6 6 Sixteen states have adopted a rule of
partial immunity,67 and in three states68 immunity is limited to exempting
trust property from execution under a tort judgment.
On the other hand, sixteen states have adopted, 69 or tend to adopt,70 a
total liability doctrine. Such a rule is also adhered to in Puerto Rico.
Whether the District of Columbia is a total liability or a partial im-
munity jurisdiction is an open question at the present time. In Hawaii a
64 See St. Luke's Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952); Moore v. Moyle,
405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
65 Christini v. Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262 (1948); Moore v. Moyle,
405 111. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950); Williams v. Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355,
3 S.W. 2d 753 (1928); McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op Industries and Stores, 272
Mass. 121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930); Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass.
299, 170 N.E. 43 (1930); De Groot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N.W. 2d 907
(1943); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930); over-
ruled in Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 212 Miss. 564, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951);
Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W. 2d 615 (1946); Herndoz v. Massey,
217 N.C. 610, 8 S.E. 2d, 914 (1940); Sudekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408,
45 A. 2d 59 (1946); Meade v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, 74 S.E. 2d 405
(W.Va., 1953); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W. 2d 212 (1942); Tovarez v.
San Juan Lodge, 68 Puerto Rico 681 (1948); Stonaker v. Big Sister's Hospital, 116 Cal.
App. 375, 2 P. 2d 520 (1931); Emrich v. Pennsylvania YMCA, 69 Ohio App. 353, 43
N.E. 2d 733 (1942); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W.
2d 284 (1938) recogn~izing the rule; Woods v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n, 6 N.J. Super.
47, 69 A. 2d 742 (1949).
66 Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts (excepting torts committed
in the course of noncharitable activities), Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania (excepting
torts committed in the course of noncharitable activities), South Carolina and Wis-
consin (excepting breach of a statutory duty).
67 Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and
Wyoming.
68 Colorado, Illinois and Tennessee.
69 Arizona, California, Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Rhode Island (apart from statutory law), and Vermont.
7 0 Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma and Utah.
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charity is not immune from tort liability incurred in the course of non-
charitable activity, but the question of immunity itself has not yet been de-
cided in a reported case. Alaska seems to follow a rule disallowing im-
munity.71
In three states no reported cases have been found.
72
The numerical weight of American jurisdictions, 73 as between the im-
munity and liability doctrines, lies with the immunity doctrine, but the
trend of recent decisions has been away from immunity and towards
liability.74
In England the doctrine of immunity was quickly overthrown while
in its early stages of infancy. Sad to say, in our own country, it has been
allowed to grow and flourish. As charitable institutions began to expand
their enterprises and take on the form of big business the idea that they
were immune from tort liability grew with them until, like everything
else that has an insecure foundation, the idea has slowly begun to subside.
The historical foundation upon which the doctrine rests has been seen to
be no foundation at all. In this day and age it is foolhardy to say that the
majority of these institutions are not members of that class known as "big
business." Why not then exempt all "big business" from tort liability?
If a clerk of a large department store injures a buyer, why not permit the
buyer to sue only the clerk? The store is big business; therefore, it should
be immune from this tort action.
If this sounds a little too caustic, perhaps an illustration of only one of
many unjust instances will lend flavor to the argument.
The case of Greatrex v. Evangelical Hospital75 is indicative; the plain-
71 Tuengel v. Sitka, Alaska, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D. C. Alaska, 1954). But see Moarts
v. Sisters of Charity, 13 Alaska 546 (D.C. Alaska, 1952).
72 Montana, New Mexico and South Dakota.
73 In England and Canada charities enjoy no immunity from tort liability.
74 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); In Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 260 P. 2d 549 (Wash., 1953), the Supreme
Court of Washington expressly overruled previous decisions and held a charitable hos-
pital liable to a paying patient regardless of whether the hospital, had been guilty of
administrative negligence, or whether it had exercised due care in the selection of its
servants. Previously these had been the criteria for ascertaining liability.
To the effect that this trend has been recognized by the courts see the following
cases: Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 7 Terry 350,83 A. 2d 753 (Del., 1951); Langheim
v. Dennison Fire Dept. Swimming Pool Ass'n, 237 Iowa 386, 21 N.W. 2d 295 (1946);
Concurring opinion of Robinson, J., in Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. 2d
204, 105 P. 2d 32 (1940); quoted with approval by Millard, J., dissenting in Weiss
v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. 2d 446, 133 P. 2d 978 (1943), where he said that the
next generation of judges will abandon the rule if the present one does not. O'Con-
nor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939); con-
curring opinion of Wolfe, J., in Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n,
94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla.
360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
75261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (1933).
COMMENTS
tiff brought his wife and week-old baby to the defendant hospital. Nine
days later the wife died and plaintiff left the baby at the hospital until he
became settled, being assured that for $1.00 per day the child would
receive the best of care. At about this time, the daughter of one Vlem-
minck gave birth to a child at the hospital, the result of an incestuous
relationship between her and her father. She too left her baby at the hos-
pital. Vlemminck came for the child and was given plaintiff's baby by
accident. Later the mistake was discovered but Vlemminck claimed that
he had given the baby to strangers passing through the city. The child
was never recovered and there was strong suspicion that Vlemminck had
disposed of the baby. Plaintiff was not allowed to recover from the hos-
pital either in tort or in contract.
Can we reasonably say that the father felt he was leaving his child in
one nurse's care? Is it not more logical to say that he left the baby under
the care of the hospital? Here is a case involving extreme mental anguish,
and yet immunity of a so called charitable institution prevented any
recovery. Natural justice and the moral law seem to be considerably out-
weighed by "immunity." But this is not an exceptional case. It is the
general rule in a large number of states. Fortunately, as has been stated,
the trend today is away from immunity and towards liability. It is to be
hoped that our courts will soon rid themselves of this doctrine complete-
ly, so that eventually we may say that in the American legal system, for
every wrong that occurs, there is an existing legal remedy.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
Generally, there is privileged communication between a client and his
attorney relevant to matters about which the attorney is giving legal
advice. This is found in early common law by virtue of a theory that
the attorney by his oath and honor would not divulge the secrets of
his client. Under this theory the attorney had the ability to waive the
privilege if his conscience would permit. Over the years this theory was
weakened by the courts, and by the last quarter of the 1700's was en-
tirely repudiated.'
By the time this doctrine was repudiated, however, a new theory had
found its way into the thinking of the courts to justify the same gen-
eral rule. It was said that the privilege belonged not to the attorney, but
to the client. It is important during litigation for the attorney to know
all of the facts so that he might better protect the interests of his client.
If the client were to believe that his statements to his attorney could be
I Wigmore, Evidence, § 2290 (3d ed., 1940).
